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BRACELETS AND THE SCOPE OF STUDENT 
SPEECH RIGHTS IN B.H. EX REL. HAWK v. 
EASTON AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT 
JACQUELYN BURKE∗ 
Abstract: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a district 
wide ban of bracelets containing the word “boobies” was an impermissible re-
striction of students’ First Amendment speech rights. The majority’s focus on 
the bracelets’ social message is critical for the preservation of students’ rights to 
discuss social issues, particularly health issues. Alternatively, Judge Hardiman’s 
dissent focused on the bracelets’ alleged sexual innuendo and did not give cre-
dence to the bracelets’ purpose. Judge Hardiman advocated upholding the ban 
due to the bracelets’ supposed sexual nature. Had Judge Hardiman prevailed, 
knowledge and awareness of a vital health issue would have been wrongly sup-
pressed because of the disease’s connection to a sexual body part. It is important 
that the majority prevailed in order for students to maintain their rights to dis-
cuss and be well informed on social issues. 
INTRODUCTION 
During the 2010–2011 school year, middle school students, B.H. and 
K.M. wore bracelets with the slogan “I ♥ boobies! (KEEP A BREAST)” to 
the Easton Area Middle School. 1  These bracelets, made by the Keep a 
Breast Foundation (“KABF”), were created with the purpose of stimulating 
dialogue and raising awareness about breast cancer in young women.2 Alt-
hough there were no disturbances or disruptions to other students’ education 
as a result of these bracelets, the school and eventually the entire school 
district banned wearing the bracelets.3 B.H. and K.M.’s respective mothers 
filed a lawsuit against the school district challenging the constitutionality of 
the ban on § 1983 grounds for the infringement of the girls’ First Amend-
ment right to free speech.4 This statute creates a civil cause of action for the 
deprivation of constitutional rights, privileges, or immunities.5 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (2013–2014). 
 1 B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 293, 299 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 2 See id. at 298. 
 3 Id. at 299–300. 
 4 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); see B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 297, 300. 
 5 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
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 The Third Circuit, siding with the girls and their mothers, held that 
the ban infringed on the girls’ First Amendment speech rights.6 The court 
found that because “I ♥ boobies! (KEEP A BREAST)” is not “plainly lewd” 
and instead advocates for a social issue (breast cancer awareness), wearing 
the bracelets may not be unconditionally banned.7 Judge Hardiman wrote a 
dissent arguing that the bracelets were lewd and an inappropriate discourse 
in a school setting.8 Adopting Judge Hardiman’s perspective would have 
narrowed speech as it relates to young women’s awareness of vital health 
issues.9 The court noted that the fact that this social issue involved breasts 
did not justify its censorship.10 The Easton School District’s ban highlights 
the dangers of allowing censorship to prevail over awareness raising dia-
logue.11 
Education in schools should go beyond just the curriculum, and extend 
to learning about how to engage social issues and confront difficult reali-
ties.12 Because preventative care is essential for women in taking control of 
their health, all young women—including middle school students—should 
have every right to raise awareness and knowledge of breast cancer.13 
                                                                                                                           
 6 See B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 323–24. 
 7 Id. at 302. 
 8 Id. at 336 (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (espousing the idea that expressions that are overly 
“sexualized” are inappropriate for young adults). 
 9 See id. at 324 (majority opinion) (pointing out that “schools cannot avoid teaching our citi-
zens-in-training how to appropriately navigate the ‘marketplace of ideas.’” (quoting Tinker v. Des 
Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969))); Brief of the Keep a Breast Foundation in Support 
of Appellees and Affirmance at 34, B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d 293 (No. 11-2067) [hereinafter 
Brief of Keep a Breast Foundation]. The bracelets are not intended to be sexual speech, but instead 
“speech designed to raise awareness of breast cancer and reduce stigma associated with openly 
discussing breast health.” Brief of Keep a Breast Foundation, supra at 29. The bracelets carry a 
message of positive body image and support for breast cancer awareness. See id. at 22. The district 
court rejected the school district’s notion that all references to women’s breasts are “inherently 
sexual” and there is nothing offensive about talking about “breasts and breast health, even in a 
middle school context.” Brief of Appellees at 50, B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d 293 (No. 11-2067). 
 10 See Brief of the Student Press Law Center in Support of Appellees B.H. & K.M. et al., and 
Affirmance at 4–5, B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 11-2067) [hereinafter 
Brief of the Student Press Law Center]. 
 11 See id. at 5–6, 34. (stating that the “social value” of breast cancer awareness is critical to 
the freedom of expression and ideas). The language of the “boobies” campaign takes aim at nega-
tive body images and taboos about self-touching in order to make women comfortable with speak-
ing about their bodies. See Brief of Keep a Breast Foundation, supra note 9, at 29. B.H. bought the 
bracelet in order to raise awareness and initiate dialogue on that subject. Brief of Appellees, supra 
note 9, at 7–8 (noting that breast cancer screening helps catch it at its early stages when it is most 
treatable). 
 12 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986). Public schools must 
prepare students to be citizens as well as teach students habits, manners, and values necessary for 
adult life in this country. Id. 
 13 See B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 335 (Hardiman, J., dissenting); Brief of Keep a Breast 
Foundation, supra note 9, at 8. 
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I. THE BANNED BRACELETS, A NATIONAL BREAST CANCER AWARENESS 
CAMPAIGN, AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF CENSORING STUDENT SPEECH 
KABF is the international foundation that created the bracelets as part 
of an ongoing effort to raise awareness about breast cancer.14 KABF be-
lieves that young women’s “negative body image[s]” significantly restrict 
their knowledge and understanding of breast cancer. 15  By targeting the 
bracelets to adolescent girls, KABF hoped to start a conversation about 
breast cancer in a light-hearted way.16 Their goal was for young women to 
become more comfortable speaking about breast cancer while simultane-
ously combating negative body images, educating young women about 
breast cancer, and encouraging them to perform self-examinations.17 B.H. 
and K.M. purchased these KABF bracelets in the fall of 2010 and wore 
them to the Easton Area Middle School. 18 Shortly thereafter, the school 
banned the bracelets and punished the girls for continuing to wear them to 
school.19 The entire school district banned the bracelets.20 The girls, howev-
er, brought suit against the district and successfully obtained an injunction 
against the ban.21 
A. Bracelets, Boobies, and the Ban 
After purchasing KABF’s “I ♥ boobies! (KEEP A BREAST)” bracelets 
with their mothers, B.H. and K.M. began wearing the bracelets to the 
Easton Area Middle School.22 Although wearing the bracelets did not cause 
any disturbances among the other students, the middle school teachers no-
ticed the girls wearing them.23 In late September 2010, the Easton Area 
Middle School principal told the schoolteachers they should ask students to 
remove wristbands with the word “boobies” on them.24 
The principal predicted an increase of students wearing the bracelets in 
October because it was breast cancer awareness month, and in anticipation 
of the school’s recognition of those events she made an announcement over 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 293, 298 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 15 See id.; Brief of Keep a Breast Foundation, supra note 9, at 14. 
 16 See B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 298. 
 17 See id. 
 18 Id. at 298–99. 
 19 Id. at 299–300. 
 20 Id. at 300. 
 21 Id. at 301. 
 22 See id. 
 23 Id. at 299. 
 24 See Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509–10 (1969) (speech that does not 
“materially and substantially interfere” with normal schools activities, or otherwise create a disor-
der or disturbance is entitled to protection under the First Amendment); B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 
F.3d at 299. 
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the school loudspeaker banning any bracelets that contained the word “boo-
bies.”25 The same day the announcement was made, a security guard no-
ticed B.H. was still wearing the “I ♥ boobies!” bracelet and demanded that 
she comply with the principal’s directive. 26 B.H. refused to remove the 
bracelet until after a meeting with the principal.27 No disagreements or con-
frontations with other students over the bracelets had occurred at any time 
that day.28 
B.H. and K.M. both wore their bracelets again the next day and again 
refused to remove them at lunch when asked to do so by a school security 
guard.29 As a result of the girls’ refusal to remove their bracelets, the school 
imposed a punishment of one-and-a-half days of in-school suspension and 
forbade them from attending the school’s winter ball.30 Shortly thereafter, 
the school district instituted a district-wide ban on the bracelets even though 
there had been no bracelet-related incidents involving other students.31 
B. The Bracelets’ Rise to the Third Circuit 
Through their mothers, B.H. and K.M. sued the Easton Area School 
District under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.32 The girls sued for a temporary restraining 
order that would allow them to attend the winter ball as well as a prelimi-
nary injunction against the school’s imposition of the bracelet ban.33 At the 
request of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, the school relented and allowed the girls to attend the dance.34 The 
district court then denied the temporary restraining order.35 
After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court preliminarily 
enjoined the school district’s bracelet ban.36 The court determined that it 
was clear that the school district’s rationale for disciplining the girls had 
changed since their punishment.37 Initially, the girls were told they were 
                                                                                                                           
 25 B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 299. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 300. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (creating a cause of action for deprivation of rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution); B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 300. Because the girls 
were minors, they were unable to sue on their own and needed to file a claim through their moth-
ers. B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 300. 
 33 B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 301. 
 34 Id. 
 35 See id. Because the school permitted the girls to attend the ball on its own, the restraining 
order became a moot point. See id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
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disciplined for “disrespect,” “defiance,” and “disruption,” yet the court dis-
covered that the district-wide ban was ultimately based on the school’s 
dress code policy and the bracelets’ theoretical sexual innuendo.38 Witness-
es at the district court evidentiary hearing stated that the assistant principals 
at the middle school claimed that the bracelets conveyed a potentially harm-
ful and confusing “sexual double entendre” to students. 39 Moreover, the 
assistant principals allegedly believed that, given the students’ immaturity 
regarding sex, they were likely to interpret the bracelets in a sexual way.40 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that because the bracelets 
did not contain lewd speech or threaten to substantially disrupt the school 
environment, B.H. and K.M. were likely to succeed upon the merits.41 Ac-
cordingly, the district court granted the preliminary injunction, and the 
school district appealed to the Third Circuit.42 
The Third Circuit has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) to re-
view “[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts[ . . . ] granting, continuing, 
modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions.” 43  The Third Circuit re-
viewed the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its legal con-
clusions de novo to determine whether a preliminary injunction ceasing the 
district-wide ban was an abuse of discretion.44 The Third Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s decision by relying on policy and Supreme Court prece-
dent.45 
                                                                                                                           
 38 Id.; Brief of Appellants & Volume I of the Joint Appendix at 9, H. v. Easton Area Sch. 
Dist., 827 F. Supp. 2d 392, 394 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (No. 11-2067) [hereinafter Brief of Appellants 
II]). 
 39 B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 301; Brief of Appellants II, supra note 38, at 9. 
 40 B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 301. KABF explicitly stated in an amicus brief, however, 
that the phrase “I ♥ boobies” was never intended to be sexy, and KABF has strategically chosen 
who sells the bracelets to ensure the message was not misconstrued sexually. See Brief of Keep a 
Breast Foundation, supra note 9, at 23. KABF refused the requests of truck stops, convenience 
stores, vending machine companies, and pornographers to sell the bracelets. Id. KABF also re-
fused to sell the bracelets to porn stars because it did not think that having such individuals as 
sponsors would be consistent with KABF’s mission and message to eliminate any sexual under-
tones from the “I ♥ boobies” campaign. Id. at 24. 
 41 B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 301. 
 42 Id. 
 43 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a)(1) (2012) (granting appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory orders); 
B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 301 (quoting Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 
F.3d 243, 252 n.10 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
 44 B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 301–02. 
 45 Id. at 324. 
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II. THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S DECISION ON THE STATUS OF  
SPEECH RIGHTS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to grant an in-
junction against the bracelet ban.46 The court found that upholding the in-
junction was in the public’s best interest.47 Additionally, the Third Circuit 
stated that giving school officials a free reign to restrict speech is incompat-
ible with Supreme Court precedent.48 The majority determined that in order 
to preserve judicial review of “student-speech” restrictions, school officials 
cannot have absolute discretion.49 Alternatively, Judge Hardiman’s dissent 
advocated for vacating the preliminary injunction because of the bracelets’ 
alleged sexual innuendo and double entendre.50 
A. The Third Circuit Upholds the Injunction for Public Policy Reasons 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s decision in granting the injunction.51 In determining whether 
the preliminary injunction was appropriate, the Third Circuit analyzed four 
factors.52 The court analyzed whether (1) the girls had a reasonable proba-
bility of success on the merits; (2) whether the girls would be irreparably 
harmed by denying the injunction; (3) whether granting the injunction 
would do greater harm to the school district and; (4) whether granting the 
injunction was in the public interest.53 
In weighing the four factors, the court focused heavily on the fourth 
element—whether the injunction was in the public interest. 54  The court 
found that public interest considerations favored B.H. and K.M. because 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 293, 323 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 47 See id. at 302 (citing Highmark, Inc. v. UPMC Health Plan, Inc., 276 F.3d 160, 170–71 (3d 
Cir. 2001). 
 48 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 407 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 
U.S. at 260, 276 (1988) (holding that schools can control the style and content of school sponsored 
publications that are reasonably related to legitimate educational concerns); Tinker v. Des Moines 
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 505, 509–10 (1969) (holding that school districts must show more than a 
“mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular 
viewpoint” in order to restrict expression by imposing a standard of “material” and “substantial” 
interference); B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 316–17 (stating that evaluating the meaning of stu-
dent speech and what can be restricted has been considered by the Supreme Court repeatedly and 
total deference to school officials has been rejected). 
 49 See B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 316. 
 50 See id. at 335–37 (Hardiman, J., dissenting). 
 51 See id. at 323 (majority opinion). 
 52 See id. at 302 (citing Highmark, Inc., 276 F.3d at 170–71). 
 53 See id. 
 54 Id. 
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free-flowing dialogue on social issues is essential for their free speech 
rights and for the awareness of the whole student body.55 
B. The Third Circuit’s Ruling Is Consistent with Free Speech Jurisprudence 
The Third Circuit rejected the school district’s argument based upon 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, which 
held that schools may define their school’s general educational mission and 
prohibit speech inconsistent with that mission.56 The Third Circuit reiterated 
that, though it was entitled to some deference, the school district did not 
have the ultimate discretion to determine what is lewd and vulgar.57 The 
Easton Area School District used a “parade of horribles” argument in sup-
port of their retaining discretion by giving examples of potentially inappro-
priate bracelets, like “I ♥ balls!” for testicular cancer.58 The Third Circuit, 
however, flatly rejected this argument and stated that there was a significant 
lack of data or empirical evidence to support such predictions and fears.59 
The Third Circuit instead noted that there is empirical data indicating 
that school districts, if given the power to do so, would eliminate all speech 
touching on or relating to sex.60 For example, the school administrators ini-
tially testified that even in the context of a breast cancer awareness cam-
paign, the word “breast” could be construed as sexual and thus subject to 
censorship.61 More fundamentally, the Third Circuit determined that in or-
der to preserve judicial review of speech restrictions in schools, administra-
tors may not have absolute discretion.62 To give school officials free reign 
                                                                                                                           
 55 See id. at 324; Brief of the Student Press Law Center, supra note 10, at 6. There is a mes-
sage about breast cancer awareness tied to these bracelets that has social value and is an essential 
part of the exposition of ideas. Id. These bracelets foster and contribute to a dialogue on breast 
cancer. Id. at 28. (“The students in this case wanted nothing more than to be participants in a sub-
stantive public issue as do students everywhere.”) 
 56 See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266; B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 316. 
 57 See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266. When school sponsored publications are censored without 
valid educational purposes, the students’ First Amendment rights are potentially in danger. See id. 
at 273; see also Morse, 551 U.S. at 407 (finding that the school’s interest in deterring student drug 
use justified what would otherwise be a restriction of the student’s First Amendment rights); Tink-
er, 393 U.S. at 506 (holding that students do not lose their constitutional rights when they enter a 
school); B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 316. 
 58 B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 317. 
 59 See id. at 317–18. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 407; Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273 (holding schools can control the 
style and content of school sponsored publications that are reasonably related to legitimate educa-
tional concerns); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509–10 (holding that school districts must show more than a 
“mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular 
viewpoint” in order to restrict expression by imposing a standard of “material” and “substantial” 
interference); B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 316–17 (stating that the evaluation of the meaning of 
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to restrict speech would be incompatible with Supreme Court precedent.63 
Because that the bracelets could reasonably be interpreted as raising aware-
ness for a social or political issue, they were protected speech.64 
The court found that because “I ♥ boobies (KEEP A BREAST)” is not 
“plainly lewd” but rather expresses support for a social issue (breast cancer 
awareness), wearing the bracelets could not be categorically restricted.65 In 
finding so, the majority focused on the social message and dialogue stimu-
lated by the bracelets.66 This approach differs distinctly from Judge Har-
diman’s dissent, which characterized the bracelets primarily as items with 
sexual undertones.67 
Although the First Amendment prevents the government from consti-
tutionally restricting expression because of its content or message, the Su-
preme Court has given schools and school districts broader latitude in regu-
lating the speech of their students.68 In the landmark case Tinker v. Des 
Moines School District, the Supreme Court held that schools may restrict 
speech that threatens to “materially and substantially interfere” with the 
school environment or that invades the rights of others.69 In Tinker, a group 
of students wore black armbands to school to demonstrate their objection to 
the Vietnam War.70 The school principals instituted a policy that required that 
students who wore the armbands would be asked to remove them.71 Never-
theless, students at the school wore the bands to intentionally challenge the 
                                                                                                                           
student speech and what can be restricted has been considered by the Supreme Court repeatedly 
and total deference to school officials has been rejected). 
 63 See B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 317. 
 64 See id. at 320. 
 65 Id. 
 66 See id. at 324 (finding that educators’ jobs go beyond teaching just the curriculum to in-
clude teaching students how to be citizens and engage in ideas such as public health campaigns). 
 67 See id. at 335 (Hardiman, J., dissenting). KABF’s brief discusses at length how the market-
ing and placement of the bracelets has been attentive to this issue by intentionally working to keep 
them educational and non-sexual, thus ensuring that the focus is on the social message conveyed 
by the bracelets. See Brief of Keep a Breast Foundation, supra note 9, at 23–24. For example, 
KABF refused the requests of truck stops, convenience stores, vending machine companies, and 
pornographers to sell the bracelets. Id. KABF also refused to sell the bracelets to porn stars be-
cause having such individuals as sponsors would be inconsistent with KABF’s mission and mes-
sage. Id. 
 68 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 395; Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004) (stating that the 
government may not restrict speech based solely on content or message). 
 69 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509–10 (holding that school districts must show more than a “mere 
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular view-
point” in order to restrict expression by imposing a standard of “material” and “substantial” inter-
ference). 
 70 See id. at 504. In response to the school’s prohibition on the black armbands, the Supreme 
Court held that expressions without any disorder or disturbance are entitled to First Amendment 
protection, and if the school could not show that the armbands materially and substantially inter-
fered with the operation of the school then conduct could not be forbidden. See id. at 509, 512. 
 71 Id. at 504. 
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ban.72 The Supreme Court held that the ban unduly restricted the students’ 
free speech rights because the armbands did not interrupt school activities 
or intrude on the affairs of other students.73 In cases since Tinker, the Su-
preme Court has held that the government can censor student speech, even 
in the absence of substantial disruption or invasion of others’ rights, in lim-
ited circumstances.74 
The Third Circuit determined that the Easton Area School District 
failed to show how the bracelets posed a disruption that would justify them 
being banned under Tinker.75 In Tinker, the Supreme Court found that de-
spite the fact that the armbands caused verbal disputes and wrecked a teach-
er’s lesson plan, they did not create a substantial enough disruption to justi-
fy their ban.76 The breast cancer awareness bracelets, in contrast, had only 
two related incidents that could qualify as disruptions, but both occurred 
post-ban and were insufficiently substantial to justify the ban.77 
The school district also argued that the ban could be upheld under the 
government’s right to categorically “restrict lewd, vulgar, profane, or plain-
ly offensive speech” in schools.78 The right to restrict lewd speech was rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.79 
In Fraser, at a high school assembly, a student nominated a peer for a posi-
tion in the class government through a speech laden with sexual metaphor.80 
The school suspended the speechmaker, and he brought a suit claiming that 
his free speech rights had been violated.81 The Supreme Court in Fraser 
upheld the student’s suspension and found that “lewd,” “vulgar,” “inde-
cent,” and plainly “offensive” student speech is categorically unprotected in 
a public school.82 
                                                                                                                           
 72 Id. 
 73 See id. at 512. 
 74 See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 108 (holding that the school can control the style and content of 
school sponsored publications that are reasonably related to legitimate educational concerns); 
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986) (finding a student’s elaborate sexual 
metaphors in speech were lewd forms of expression that were not protected by the First Amend-
ment). 
 75 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509; B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 321. 
 76 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 517–18. 
 77 See B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 321. The court reasoned that the two related incidents 
were slight disturbances that could not justify this restriction on free speech. Id. 
 78 B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 302; see Fraser, 478 U.S. at 686 (holding that schools had 
the authority to restrict language that was profane, vulgar, or lewd). 
 79 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 686. 
 80 Id. at 678. 
 81 Id. The student brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “alleging a violation of his free 
speech rights.” Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (creating a civil cause of action for constitutional 
violations). 
 82 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683, 686. The Court stated that public education goes beyond class-
room curriculum and encompasses teaching students about society’s shared values. Id. Moreover, 
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In B.H. ex rel. Hawk, the school district argued its suspension was jus-
tified under Fraser in two ways: (1) it was banning speech that was unam-
biguously lewd, vulgar, or profane; and (2) it was not restricting speech that 
comments on any social or political issue.83 The Third Circuit agreed that 
unless the speech in question could be interpreted as commentary on a so-
cial or political issue, then schools may ban forms of expression that could 
reasonably be interpreted as profane or lewd.84 In that regard, the Third Cir-
cuit found that the ban could not be upheld under Fraser because the brace-
lets were not objectively lewd.85 Additionally, because breast cancer aware-
ness is a social issue the ban could not be justified under Fraser. 86 
C. Justice Hardiman’s Dissenting Opinion 
Rather than focusing on the social message behind the bracelets, Judge 
Hardiman focused on the bracelets’ supposed sexual innuendo in his dis-
sent, and as a result, characterized them as a form of lewd speech.87 Judge 
Hardiman wrote that the majority’s approach would allow for lewd speech 
in public schools so long as it met the majority’s notion of social or political 
messaging, a position Judge Hardiman found contrary to Fraser.88 
Judge Hardiman stated that it is objectively reasonable to interpret 
these bracelets as inappropriate sexual innuendo and double entendre, and 
therefore it would be more appropriate to reverse the district court and va-
cate the preliminary injunction.89 He reasoned that the district court was 
misguided in focusing on the strategic purpose of the words, and also that 
the case’s holding would set a dangerous precedent. 90 Judge Hardiman stat-
ed that the majority’s holding prohibiting schools from banning bracelets 
seeking to raise breast cancer awareness would force schools in the future to 
permit more shocking messages.91 He reasoned that if these bracelets are 
                                                                                                                           
the Court reasoned that teachers and older students are role models of proper civil discourse and 
the school has authority to control how that civil discourse is modeled in schools. See id. 
 83 See B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 302, 307. 
 84 See id. at 302 (finding that if the speech could be interpreted as commenting on a social or 
political issue, it could not be restricted by the school). 
 85 See id. 
 86 See id. The Third Circuit emphasized that because the bracelet can reasonably be interpret-
ed as social speech, it is entitled to protection from bans. See id. at 314, 320 (finding that the 
bracelets advocated for the national breast cancer awareness campaign, thus qualifying as a social 
message). 
 87 See id. at 335–37 (Hardiman, J., dissenting). 
 88 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682; B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 338 (Hardiman, J., dissenting). 
The Court found that although the First Amendment grants significant discretion in adult speech, 
that does not equate to allowing such speech in schools. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682. 
 89 See B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 338 (Hardiman, J., dissenting). 
 90 See id. at 336–37. 
 91 See id. 
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permissible, then it would be difficult to articulate a principle that would 
limit other messages such as “I ♥ Balls” to support testicular cancer.92 
III. THE NECESSITY OF STUDENTS’ FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
Judge Hardiman’s proposed standard would give school officials the 
power to restrict any speech in the school context that could reasonably be 
interpreted as sexual innuendo or double entendre, regardless of the speech’s 
beneficial social or political message. 93  Consequently, Judge Hardiman 
would have vacated the preliminary injunction and upheld the district-wide 
ban, which inevitably would have stymied young women’s education and 
awareness of breast cancer. 94 Under Judge Hardiman’s standard, student 
speech, specifically young women’s speech, would be unduly restricted.95 
The bracelets were targeted at young women in order to educate them about 
a fatal health issue specific to women, and to disallow their presence in 
school is to stifle the spreading of knowledge about breast cancer.96 An ex-
press purpose of KABF to inspire young people “to be their own advocates” 
in order to spread knowledge about breast cancer.97 For women under the 
age of forty, breast cancer is the leading cause of cancer-related deaths, 
making dialogue about this issue especially important. 98  Despite of this 
grave risk, Judge Hardiman would ban speech that garners awareness on the 
subject in public schools, primarily because such speech involves a sexual 
body part.99 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the teaching function of 
schools goes beyond purely academics and includes conversations revolv-
ing around social and political issues.100 The majority in B.H. ex rel. Hawk 
recognized this and reflected on the unique challenges teachers face to-
                                                                                                                           
 92 See id. at 337. 
 93 See B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 293, 335 (Hardiman, J., dissent-
ing) (3d Cir. 2013). 
 94 See id. at 338; Brief of Keep a Breast Foundation, supra note 9, at 1. 
 95 See B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 335 (Hardiman, J., dissenting); Brief of the Student 
Press Law Center, supra note 10, at 2. At stake in this case is the protection of students’ right to 
free speech from the “overzealous” application of school policy that can unjustly limit students’ 
non-curricular education. Brief of the Student Press Law Center, supra note 10, at 2. 
 96 See Brief of Keep a Breast Foundation, supra note 9, at 1, 7, 29 (stating that the purpose of 
the bracelets is to “promote awareness and knowledge of the breast cancer epidemic among all 
young people and to encourage them to advocate for their own health” and that failure to permit 
them would frustrate the purpose of the bracelets entirely). 
 97 See Brief of Keep a Breast Foundation, supra note 9, at 4. 
 98 See id. at 48. 
 99 See B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 335 (Hardiman, J., dissenting); Brief of Keep a Breast 
Foundation, supra note 9, at 8. 
 100 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986). Public schools must 
both prepare students to be citizens and teach them habits, manners, and values necessary for adult 
life in this country. Id. 
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day.101 Teachers constantly compete with distractions such as cell phones 
and bullying as they try to reach students.102 The majority stressed the im-
portance of educators trying to teach students proper social values in this 
over-stimulated environment.103 Accordingly, the majority properly recog-
nized the value of speech crafted to stimulate discussion in this environ-
ment, such as the KABF’s “I ♥ boobies! (KEEP A BREAST)” bracelets.104 
Unjustly silencing speech that can stimulate dialogue about breast can-
cer, and other diseases that involve sexual body parts, is harmful for stu-
dents’ health and development.105 Because breast cancer is a disease that 
requires self-education and awareness in order to be properly diagnosed, 
suppression of this kind of speech could have grave long-term consequenc-
es.106 The majority correctly recognized that a bracelet intended to raise 
breast cancer awareness is just the type of socially valuable idea that should 
be allowed in schools.107 
CONCLUSION 
In B.H. ex rel. Hawk, the Third Circuit held that a school district could 
not ban students from wearing bracelets that raised breast cancer awareness 
simply because the bracelets could be interpreted as being sexual in nature. 
The Third Circuit relied on public policy and Supreme Court precedent in 
holding against the school district. In finding the bracelet ban an unconstitu-
tional infringement upon B.H. and K.M.’s First Amendment rights, the 
Third Circuit correctly protected student speech on social issue, even issues 
that involve sexual body parts such as breast cancer. 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Hardiman wrongly disregarded the so-
cial message behind the bracelets, and overstated their sexual nature. Breast 
                                                                                                                           
 101 See B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 324. 
 102 See id. 
 103 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683; see also McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 243 
(3d Cir. 2010) (“Public elementary and high school education is as much about learning how to be 
a good citizen as it is about multiplication tables and United States history.”). 
 104 See Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 505, 511 (1969). The Court reasoned that 
the classroom is where ideas are exchanged and where the nation’s future leaders are being trained 
through engagement and exposure to a wide variety of those ideas. Id.; see B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 
F.3d at 324. Schools cannot avoid teaching students how to engage with the exchange of varied 
ideas. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511; B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 324. Fear of confronting unpop-
ular ideas in the classroom does not justify restricting social speech of value. See Tinker, 393 U.S. 
at 511; B.H. ex rel. Hawk, 725 F.3d at 324. 
 105 See Brief of Keep a Breast Foundation, supra note 9, at 7 (arguing that “breast cancer 
screening . . . . can help find breast cancer early when it is most treatable . . . .”). 
 106 See id. 
 107 See id. at 1; Brief of the Student Press Law Center, supra note 10, at 5 (arguing that the 
bracelets undeniably carry a socially valuable message). 
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cancer is deadly disease, and the fact that it involves a sexual body part 
does not justify restricting conversation about it. 
